PJC Business 2024

PJC 106.2

T ORTIOUS I NTERFERENCE

S.W.2d at 210–12, 216; Bennett v. Computer Associates International , 932 S.W.2d 197, 202–03 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied) (“[T]he SupremeCourt effec tively eviscerated motive from good faith and left the concept to mean something akin to ‘having [an objectively] well grounded and justifiable belief of a right.’”) (quoting Texas Beef Cattle Co. , 921 S.W.2d at 211). The law uses different definitions of “good faith” in different contexts. Compare Wichita County v. Hart , 917 S.W.2d 779, 784–85 (Tex. 1996) (acknowledging variations in “good faith” definitions and adopting objec tive and subjective component of “good faith” under Whistleblower Act), with City of Lancaster v. Chambers , 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex. 1994) (“objective legal reasonable ness” required for official immunity), and La Sara Grain Co. v. First National Bank of Mercedes , 673 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. 1984) (“actual [subjective] belief of the party in question, not the reasonableness of that belief” under UCC). If a definition of “good faith” is necessary to guide the jury, the Committee expresses no opinion on the proper definition of “good faith” in the justification context. Exercise of privilege by illegal or tortious means. “A party may not exercise an otherwise legitimate privilege by resort to illegal or tortious means.” Prudential Insur ance Co. of America v. Financial Review Services, Inc. , 29 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex. 2000). Thus, even if a defendant establishes a legal right or privilege, “if the plaintiff pleads and proves methods of interference that are tortious in themselves, then the issue of privilege or justification never arises.” Prudential Insurance Co. of America , 29 S.W.3d at 81; see also Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. 2002) (exercise of contractual right of first refusal that violates statutory prohibition may establish lack of justification). The Committee expresses no opinion on whether in the context of a claim for intentional interference with an existing contract a defendant may nevertheless raise “defenses to the wrongfulness of the alleged [tortious or wrongful] conduct.” Sturges , 52 S.W.3d at 727.

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