PJC Business 2024

PJC 106.4

T ORTIOUS I NTERFERENCE

ties agree Anderson was an at-will employee.”); Lazer Spot , 387 S.W.3d at 53 (“[A] claim of tortious interference cannot be premised merely on the hiring of an at-will employee.”); PrinterOn, Inc. v. BreezyPrint Corp. , 93 F. Supp. 3d 658, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“Courts have limited Sterner to cases involving at-will employment contracts and to alleged interference that was either defamatory or that breached an independent contract obligation.”). To be actionable, the inducement may have to breach some pro vision of the parties’ at-will contract or some other agreement. See Greenville , 465 S.W.3d at 787 (plaintiff tried to prove defendant’s tortious interference with plaintiff’s at-will employee by showing defendant’s attempt to induce the employee’s violation of a non-compete agreement with the plaintiff, but failed to show defendant was aware of that agreement before hiring him); Lazer Spot , 387 S.W.3d at 52 (noting that Mara thon Oil’s justification defense in Sterner turned on whether its contract with Sterner’s employer precluded Marathon Oil from interfering with the employer’s management of Sterner and its other employees); Graham v. Mary Kay, Inc. , 25 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (tortious inducement of Mary Kay consultants to breach the direct-sales clause in their consulting agreements with Mary Kay). There is some authority for treating a claim of interference with an existing contract that may be terminated at will or on notice as being, in reality, a claim for interference with prospective contractual or business relations (see PJC 106.3). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals has held that a tortious interference claim arising out of a contract terminable at will or on notice involves primarily the prospect of a continuing business relationship and therefore is properly characterized as a claim for tortious interference with a prospective business relationship. Faucette v. Chantos , 322 S.W.3d 901, 914– 16 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. g (1979)). In El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd. v. Murphy , 518 S.W.3d 412, 421 n.6 (Tex. 2017), the supreme court implied that this is correct by acknowl edging that, in Sturges , it “suggested (without discussion) that Sterner [terminable-at will employment contract] and Juliette Fowler [terminable-on-notice sales representa tive contract] involved claims for interference with prospective business relations.”

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