PJC Business

PJC 102.14

DTPA/I NSURANCE C ODE

bility question commingles valid and invalid theories of liability such that it cannot be determined whether the improperly submitted theories formed the sole basis for the jury’s finding. Casteel , 22 S.W.3d at 388–89. For further discussion, see PJC 116.2 regarding broad-form issues and the Casteel doctrine. Knowing conduct. If the defendant is found to have knowingly engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice, the Insurance Code provides for additional dam ages. Tex. Ins. Code § 541.152(b). See PJC 102.21 for a question on knowing conduct and PJC 115.11 for a question on additional damages. Additional damages. An award of additional damages is discretionary with the trier of fact if the defendant acted knowingly. To seek additional damages, the plaintiff should submit the question on knowing conduct as in PJC 102.21 and then should ask the jury to determine the amount of additional damages as in PJC 115.11. Causation. Unlike the DTPA questions (PJC 102.1, 102.7, and 102.8), PJC 102.14 does not contain the term “producing cause,” because the Insurance Code does not refer to “producing cause” as an element. Instead, the Code grants a cause of action to a person who has sustained actual damages “caused by” another’s engaging in a prohibited act. See Tex. Ins. Code §541.151 (formerly Tex. Ins. Code art. 21.21, §16(a)). The Committee believes that “producing cause” need not be submitted to obtain actual damages as long as the damages question inquires about damages that were caused by the prohibited conduct. The insurance damages question, PJC 115.13, contains such an inquiry. For a discussion of the special causation issues relating to recovery of policy benefits as damages, see the PJC 115.13 Comment. Vicarious liability. If the issue is the vicarious liability of one for another’s con duct, see Celtic Life Insurance Co. v. Coats , 885 S.W.2d 96, 98–99 (Tex. 1994) (dis cussing principal’s liability for acts of agent within the actual or apparent scope of the agent’s authority in DTPA and Insurance Code case); and Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Wilson , 768 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1988, writ denied) (citing Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Love , 121 S.W.2d 986, 990 (Tex. 1938)) (company liable for unreasonable collection efforts of outside attorneys com mitted for the purpose of accomplishing the mission entrusted to the attorneys).

[PJC 102.15 is reserved for expansion.]

.

162