PJC General Negligence 2022

PJC 13.4

A NIMAL I NJURY

PJC 13.4

Domesticated Animal That Is Not Abnormally Dangerous

QUESTION ______ On the occasion in question, did the negligence, if any, of any of those named below proximately cause Paul Payne ’s injuries? Answer “Yes” or “No” for each of the following: 1. Don Davis _______________ 2. Paul Payne _______________ COMMENT When to use. PJC 13.4 should be given when the domesticated animal that caused the injuries did not have dangerous propensities abnormal to its class. See Mar shall v. Ranne , 511 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. 1974) (possessor of nonvicious animal may be liable for negligent handling of animal). Conditioning instruction. A party may choose to submit the issues under both strict liability and negligence liability standards regardless of the jury’s finding regard ing the alleged dangerous propensities of the animal in question. In such circum stances, no conditioning instruction would be submitted as part of either PJC 13.3 or PJC 13.4. However, if a party prefers that the jury make a single liability finding, the following instruction may be submitted as a predicate to PJC 13.4: If, in answer to Question ______ [ question regarding dangerous propensities ], you found that [ describe animal in question ] had dan gerous propensities abnormal to its class, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question. Negligence and proximate cause. This question should be submitted with the definitions of negligence, PJC 2.1, and proximate cause, PJC 2.4. Plaintiff’s negligence/assumption of risk. The plaintiff’s conduct in relation to the animal in question might be subject to a comparative responsibility allocation. But see Marshall , 511 S.W.2d at 258 (negligence in failing to discover dangerous animal or take precautions against possible harm will not reduce plaintiff’s recovery, but vol untary assumption of risk of harm might be valid defense to liability); see also Moore v. McKay , 55 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1932, no writ). The Committee notes that Marshall predates Texas’s adoption of comparative responsibility and takes no position on the remaining viability of the court’s holding in this respect.

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