PJC General Negligence 2022

PJC 5.1

N EGLIGENCE P ER S E

§§ 545.103, 545.152 (turning left at intersection)). When a statute, such as these, adds nothing to the “ordinary care” standard, there is no reason to submit a question on the statutory standard or to instruct the jury regarding it because to do so would be redun dant. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. , 976 S.W.2d at 675; Williams v. Price , 308 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In such cases, the negligence per se standard is subsumed under the broad-form negligence question (PJC 4.1). On the other hand, when a statute creates a standard different from “ordinary care,” it should be brought to the jury’s attention, as provided in PJC 5.1 or, in special situa tions, as provided in PJC 5.2 and 5.3. Usual case involves both common-law negligence and negligence per se. Frequently a case involving a negligence per se claim also includes a claim of com mon-law negligence. In the example in PJC 5.1, one party claims that the other party drove the wrong way on a one-way street, in violation of Tex. Transp. Code § 545.059 (negligence per se). Each party also claims the other failed to use “ordinary care” (common-law negligence). In such cases, the Committee recommends the use of an instruction immediately after the definition of “negligence,” informing the jury that the statutory conduct is negligence in itself, along with a broad-form question jointly submitting negligence and proximate cause (see PJC 4.1). Alternative instructions. The instruction accompanying the definition of “negli gence” might be worded a variety of ways. Acceptable formulations for its first sen tence include— The violation of a traffic law is negligence in itself, and you are instructed that the law forbids driving the wrong way on a street des ignated and signposted as one-way . or— It is also negligence to drive the wrong way on a street designated and signposted as one-way . If uncertain whether violation is negligence per se. It may not be advisable to use a broad-form submission if there is genuine uncertainty whether the violation con stitutes negligence per se. Use of a broad-form question may require a new trial if the charge incorrectly makes no mention of a statute or regulation, the violation of which the appellate court finds amounts to negligence per se. Conversely, if the charge instructs on negligence per se but the appellate court finds (for example) that the party relying on the statute was not within the class intended to be protected, a new trial might also be required. In this situation it would be better to submit both a separate question asking if the statutory conduct was committed and a broad-form question (as in PJC 4.1) accompa nied by an instruction that excludes consideration of the statutory conduct (e.g., “In your determination of this question, you shall not consider whether Don Davis drove

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