Texas PJC Malpractice 2022

PJC 51.18

M EDICAL M ALPRACTICE —T HEORIES OF D IRECT L IABILITY

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth, Mar. 8, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that the willful and wanton standard is a gross negligence standard even when the trial is in the form of a summary judgment); Ho v. Johnson , No. 09-15-00077-CV, 2016 WL 638046, at *11 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 18, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same); Turner v. Franklin , 325 S.W.3d 771, 780–81 & n.12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (same). But cf. Benish v. Grottie , 281 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (declining to equate willful and wanton negligence with gross negligence when evaluating the sufficiency of chapter 74 preliminary expert reports). If emergency is not in issue. PJC 51.18B assumes the parties will not agree on whether the willful and wanton standard of proof applies. Whether a defendant pro vided “emergency medical care” requiring a willful and wanton standard is a question for the jury. See Glenn v. Leal , 596 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Tex. 2020). If, however, the par ties agree that the willful and wanton standard of proof applies, only Questions 2 and 3, without the accompanying predicate instructions, should be submitted.

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