Texas PJC Malpractice 2022

N ONMEDICAL M ALPRACTICE —D EFINITIONS & I NSTRUCTIONS

PJC 60.1

PJC 60.1

Nonmedical Professional’s Degree of Care; Proximate Cause

“Negligence,” when used with respect to the conduct of Dora Dotson , means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which an accountant of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which an accountant of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances. “Ordinary care,” when used with respect to the conduct of Dora Dotson , means that degree of care that an accountant of ordinary prudence would use under the same or similar circumstances. “Proximate cause,” when used with respect to the conduct of Dora Dotson , means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an [ injury ] [ occur rence ], and without which cause such [ injury ] [ occurrence ] would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that an accountant using ordinary care would have foreseen that the [ injury ] [ occurrence ], or some similar [ injury ] [ occurrence ], might reason ably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an [ injury ] [ occurrence ]. COMMENT Source of definitions. The definitions include the standard and accepted elements of nonmedical professional malpractice. See Rogers v. Zanetti , 518 S.W.3d 394, 400 (Tex. 2017) (attorney); Atkins v. Crosland , 406 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1966), rev’d on other grounds , 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967) (accountant); Ryan v. Mor gan Spear Associates, Inc. , 546 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (architect). The definition of “proximate cause” is based on lan guage from Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crump : [W]e first examine the causation standards for proximate cause and produc ing cause. “The two elements of proximate cause are cause in fact (or sub stantial factor) and foreseeability. . . . Cause in fact is established when the act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries, and without it, the harm would not have occurred.” IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. v. Mason , 143 S.W.3d 794, 798–99 (Tex. 2004). “The approved definition of ‘proximate cause’ in negligence cases and the approved definition of ‘producing cause’ in compensation cases are in substance the same, except that there is added to the definition of proximate cause the element of fore seeableness.” [ Texas Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Staggs , 134 S.W.2d 1026,

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