Texas PJC Malpractice 2022

P RODUCTS L IABILITY —D EFINITIONS , I NSTRUCTIONS & Q UESTIONS

PJC 70.4

PJC 70.4 Sole Cause—Products Liability There may be more than one cause of an [ injury ] [ occurrence ], but if an act or omission of any person not a party to the suit was the “sole cause” of the [ injury ] [ occurrence ], then no act, omission, or product of any party could have been a cause of the [ injury ] [ occurrence ]. COMMENT When to use. If “sole cause” is raised by the evidence, PJC 70.4 should be used in lieu of the last sentence of the definition in PJC 70.1. See Dresser Industries v. Lee , 880 S.W.2d 750, 752–53 (Tex. 1993). Use of “injury” or “occurrence.” See PJC 71.1. Caveat. Instructions are proper only if they are raised by the pleadings and the evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 278. Submission of an instruction that is not supported by evidence may be reversible error. See Galvan v. Fedder , 678 S.W.2d 596, 598–99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The refusal to give any inferential rebuttal instruction, even if properly requested and supported by the evidence, is not necessarily reversible error. “Sole cause” is an inferential rebuttal instruction. See Thota v. Young , 366 S.W.3d 678, 684 (Tex. 2012). The Texas Supreme Court has held that (1) trial courts have sig nificant discretion in determining which inferential rebuttal instructions to submit, Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell , 517 S.W.2d 245, 256 (Tex. 1974); (2)even if an inferential rebuttal instruction is supported by the evidence, submitting it is not mandatory, Gunn v. McCoy , 554 S.W.3d 645, 676 (Tex. 2018); (3)multiple inferential rebuttal instruc tions have “the potential to skew the jury’s analysis,” Dillard v. Texas Electric Cooper ative , 157 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. 2005); and (4)the trial court’s decision regarding whether to submit an inferential rebuttal instruction is subject to a harmless error anal ysis. Gunn , 544 S.W.3d at 676; Thota , 366 S.W.3d at 687.

217