Texas PJC Malpractice 2022

M EDICAL M ALPRACTICE —D EFINITIONS , I NSTRUCTIONS & Q UESTIONS PJC 50.2

PJC 50.2 Hospital’s Degree of Care; Proximate Cause “Negligence,” when used with respect to the conduct of Dixon Hospital , means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a hospital of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a hospital of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances. “Ordinary care,” when used with respect to the conduct of Dixon Hospital , means that degree of care that a hospital of ordinary prudence would use under the same or similar circumstances. “Proximate cause,” when used with respect to the conduct of Dixon Hospi tal , means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an [ injury ] [ occurrence ], and without which cause such [ injury ] [ occurrence ] would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission com plained of must be such that a hospital using ordinary care would have foreseen that the [ injury ] [ occurrence ], or some similar [ injury ] [ occurrence ], might rea sonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an [ injury ] [ occurrence ]. COMMENT Source of definitions. These definitions reflect the standards imposed on a hospi tal. See Harris v. Harris County Hospital District , 557 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.—Hous ton [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ). The definition of “proximate cause” is based on language from Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crump : [W]e first examine the causation standards for proximate cause and produc ing cause. “The two elements of proximate cause are cause in fact (or sub stantial factor) and foreseeability. . . . Cause in fact is established when the act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries, and without it, the harm would not have occurred.” IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. v. Mason , 143 S.W.3d 794, 798–99 (Tex. 2004). “The approved definition of ‘proximate cause’ in negligence cases and the approved definition of ‘producing cause’ in compensation cases are in substance the same, except that there is added to the definition of proximate cause the element of fore seeableness.” [ Texas Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Staggs , 134 S.W.2d 1026, 1028–29 (Tex. 1940).] In other words, the producing cause inquiry is con ceptually identical to that of cause in fact. Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crump , 330 S.W.3d 211, 222–23 (Tex. 2010). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma , 242 S.W.3d 32, 46 (Tex. 2007).

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