pjc-oil-and-gas-2022-lib

PJC 301.2

A DVERSE P OSSESSION

S.W.3d 913, 914–15 (Tex. 2006) (discussing claim of right); Calfee v. Duke , 544 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. 1976) (same); Orsborn v. Deep Rock Oil Corp. , 267 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1954) (discussing hostile claim of right); Villarreal v. Guerra , 446 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied) (defining the test for hostility); Taub v. Houston Pipeline Co. , 75 S.W.3d 606, 626 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (same); McCuen v. Huey , 255 S.W.3d 716, 732 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (defining muniment). Broad-form submission. Submission of adverse possession elements in one question is proper. Pinchback v. Hockless , 158 S.W.2d 997, 1003 (Tex. 1942); Davis v. Dowlen , 136 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1939, writ dism’d judgm’t cor.). The entire time period over which adverse possession is claimed should be submitted in a single question. Pinchback , 158 S.W.2d at 1002. Title. “‘Title’ means a regular chain of transfers of real property from or under the sovereignty of the soil.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.021. Construction of a deed is generally a question of law. See, e.g., Terrill v. Tuckness , 985 S.W.2d 97, 101–03 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (trespass-to-try-title action discussing deed construction). Moreover, evidence may establish a regular chain of conveyances from the sovereign as a matter of law. See, e.g., Longoria v. Lasater , 292 S.W.3d 156, 165– 69 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied) (deciding regular chain of title in tres pass-to-try-title action by summary judgment); Terrill , 985 S.W.2d at 101–03 (nothing for jury to resolve in trespass-to-try-title suit when question of law as between two competing meanings of deed); see also Moser v. Tucker , 195 S.W. 259, 260 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1917, no writ) (“The parties having contracted for an abstract show ing a merchantable title, which we construe to mean a marketable title, as it appears upon the records only, the question under this record becomes one of law.”). A jury, however, should resolve any issues of disputed fact with regard to title, which may require that additional questions precede the adverse possession question. See, e.g., Terrill , 985 S.W.2d at 101–03 (construction of ambiguous deed may present fact ques tion); Niles v. Houston Oil Co. , 288 S.W. 614, 617 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1926, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (alleged forgery of deed may present fact question); Smith v. Cavitt , 50 S.W. 167, 167 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1899, no writ) (same). Because title is generally a question of law, title is not included in the question and instead the jury is asked about the disputed facts on adverse, peaceable possession for the requisite period. Color of title/muniments. Color of title may be a fact question. See, e.g., Mead ers v. Moore , 132 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. 1939); Capps v. Gibbs , No. 10-12-00294-CV, 2013 WL 1701772, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 18, 2013) (holding reasonable fact finder could find evidence constituted color of title based on consecutive chain of transfers). If color of title is a disputed question, include the phrase under color of title in the question and its definition in the instructions. The definition tracks the statute. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.021. For cases interpreting color of title, see Capps , 2013 WL 1701772, at *4–5, and Oncale v. Veyna , 798 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. App.—

40