pjc-oil-and-gas-2022-lib

A DVERSE P OSSESSION

PJC 301.2

Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (citing Grigsby v. May , 19 S.W. 343, 348 (Tex. 1892) (construing similarly worded predecessor statute)). “A quitclaim deed is not a conveyance or a muniment of title. By itself, it does not establish any title in those holding the deed, but merely passes the interest of the grantor in the property.” Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises , 884 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. 1994). Color of title/other documents. In addition to muniments of title, section 16.021 also defines color of title to include “a consecutive chain of transfers to the person in possession that... is based on a certificate of headright, land warrant, or land scrip.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §16.021. If the case involves a certificate of headright, land warrant, or land scrip, modify the instruction on color of title and consider whether additional definitions should be included. Color of title/similar defect. In addition to muniments of title, section 16.021 also defines color of title to include “a consecutive chain of transfers to the person in possession that . . . is not regular because of a muniment that is not properly recorded or is only in writing or because of a similar defect that does not want of intrinsic fair ness.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §16.021(2)(a). The term “intrinsic fairness” relates “to the means of proving the right of property in the land, [so as to make the defective] title equitably equal to a regular chain.” Grigsby , 19 S.W. at 348 (constru ing similarly worded predecessor statute). If the purported transfers of title cited by a party claiming property under color of title were “freely executed by the persons whose acts they appear to be,” they are sufficient under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §16.024 “if upon their faces they show such right to land as a court of equity would enforce as between the parties to the instruments....” Grigsby , 19 S.W. at 349. If the case involves an irregular chain of title not otherwise specified in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §16.021(2)(b), modify the instruction on color of title and consider whether additional definitions should be included. Under title/color of title. If a case involves a claim of both title and color of title, modification of the question or an additional question may be required and further instruction from the trial court regarding legal title may be necessary. See, e.g., Wilson v. Whetstone , No. 03-08-00738-CV, 2010 WL 1633087, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 20, 2010, pet. denied) (instructing jury that defendants had record title to disputed area). Possession of mineral estate. Adverse possession of the surface estate results in adverse possession of the mineral estate unless the two estates have been severed. Grissom v. Anderson , 79 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1935). Once severed from the surface estate, the mineral estate may be acquired only by adverse possession of the mineral estate and not by adverse possession of the surface estate. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool , 124 S.W.3d 188, 192–93, 198 (Tex. 2003); Thedford v. Union Oil Co. of California , 3 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. denied); Barfield v. Holland , 844 S.W.2d 759, 767 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, writ denied); Watkins v. Cer tain-Teed Products Corp. , 231 S.W.2d 981, 985 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1950, no writ).

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